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The Role of Privatization 
Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Taken together, the privatisation program in Britain probably 
marked the largest transfer of power and  property since the 
dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. 
-M.  Pirie, Privutisution 
2.1  Introduction and Summary 
In 1979, when Margaret Thatcher came to power, publicly owned com- 
panies produced roughly 12 percent of U.K. gross domestic product (GDP). 
By the time of the election of the Labour government in 1997, this figure 
had fallen to 2 percent. At least in the United Kingdom, public ownership 
seems to have been discredited. The Labour Party, which had initially met 
the privatization program  with  the policy of renationalization  without 
compensation, is now running privatizations of its own. In the meantime, 
the opinion and experience of U.K. privatization practitioners and regula- 
tors is sought throughout the world. In the United Kingdom, the debate 
has now shifted from the sales of publicly owned assets to the issues of fran- 
chise design for public services, public-private partnerships, and internal 
markets in state organizations.' 
In this chapter we try to answer some of the following questions. First, 
what were the origins of privatization? Was the policy the natural outcome 
of Conservative thinking, or was it a decisive break from the past? Second, 
why has privatization proved so enduring? Why is renationalization off the 
Richard  Green  is  professor  of economics  at the  University  of  Hull Business School. 
Jonathan Haskel is professor of economics at Queen Mary University of London. 
We thank David Card, Richard Freeman, John Kingman, and conference participants for 
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Jonathan Ashworth and Matt Barnes for expert 
research assistance. The plant-level data in this paper were prepared under the Office for Na- 
tional Statistics Business Data Linking Project. Errors are our own. 
1. Following Kay and Thompson (1986), we think of privatization as a term covering vari- 
ous means of changing the relationships between government-provided economic activity 
and the private sector. The main areas of government activity are (or were) in (1) various in- 
dustries, such as utilities, steel, and cars; (2) infrastructure, such as roads and railways; and 
(3) social services, such as pensions, health, and schools. 
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agenda? Third, and important in the context of diagnosing Britain’s failure 
to reach the premier league of output per head over the last twenty years, 
did privatization raise productivity in the companies concerned? If it did 
not, what future steps concerning privatization or the privatized compa- 
nies can be taken that might improve performance? 
Our purpose in the chapter is partly to survey existing evidence and 
partly to bring new evidence to bear on these questiom2  The following 
summarizes our argument. We start in the next section with an overview of 
the history of public-ownership levels in the United Kingdom and other 
countries. Before World War 11,  industries such as steel, coal, and trans- 
portation were mostly privately owned, with a few exceptions (the British 
Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] and British Overseas Airways Corpora- 
tion). Utilities (gas, electricity, and water) were a mix of private and mu- 
nicipally owned, with some regulation (a position similar to the United 
States today). The major wave of nationalization occurred during the post- 
war Labour government (gas, electricity, steel, coal, and rail), aligning the 
United Kingdom with other European countries. Subsequent pre-Thatcher 
Conservative administrations privatized some industries (steel in 1953, for 
example) but equally nationalized  some (Rolls-Royce in  1971) and at- 
tempted no major privatization of, for example, the utilities. Thus, privati- 
zation was in no sense inevitable; The Thatcher program was a decisive 
break from the past. 
Although Thatcher came into ofice with a pro-market philosophy, the 
word “privatization” does not appear anywhere in the 1979 Conservative 
Party manifesto.) Privatization, at least on a large scale, was in fact some- 
thing of an accident. During the early 1980s, it became apparent that the 
state-owned  telephone  monopoly,  British  Telecommunications,  would 
have to undertake huge investment, in part because of previous unwise de- 
cisions on which technology to adopt (Gala1 et al. 1994). By  Treasury ac- 
counting rules, such investment would count as public spending, which the 
government was committed to reduce, and all schemes to finance this 
public investment off the public balance sheet failed. The government de- 
cided to sell the company, ensuring that its investment would take place in 
the private sector, and they discovered that the sale was very popular with 
its supporters and extended the policy. 
What effect is privatization likely to have? As we discuss in section 2.3, 
2. This paper is predominantly a survey, but it does offer two original pieces of research. 
First, we look at newly assembled data on total factor productivity (TFP) for a series of pre- 
viously public companies. Second, we use plant-level data for an industry that had a mix of 
public and private plants in 1979 (confidentiality precludes us from revealing the plants con- 
cerned), and we look at their relative productivities and at the contributions of plant closure 
to productivity growth. 
3. There were commitments to return a few companies to the private sector, but the term 
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economists have naturally focused on the possible efficiency gains from 
privatization, but these were not uppermost in politicians’ minds at the 
time. Rather, as sections 2.4 and 2.5 set out, privatization  was a way  of 
meeting a number of economic and political objectives, such as reducing 
the power of public-sector trade unions. Management remained more or 
less the same, as did market structure (at least until the later privatizations 
of electricity and the railways). A number of steps were taken to try to  make 
privatization  irreversible,  such  as  making  shareholding  widespread 
enough so that the opposition Labour Party’s then stance of renational- 
ization without compensation (later dropped) would potentially harm a 
large pool of shareholders. 
Section 2.6 studies efficiency. Most studies of the major industries and 
utilities in the 1979 public sector start from the observation that the biggest 
improvements in productivity came before much of the sector was priva- 
tized. This suggests that restructuring and competition are more impor- 
tant in raising productivity than ownership per se. Studies of contracting 
out reach a similar conclusion. In refuse collection, for example, it is pos- 
sible to compare costs when collection remains in the public sector without 
competition (i.e., the service being tendered), when it remains in the public 
sector with competition, and when it passes to the private sector. Evidence 
suggests that savings are similar whether collection is public or private as 
long as there is competition (i.e., tendering) for the service. 
After all this, it seems appropriate to ask: Did the U.K. economy need 
privatization? To the extent that competition (and not ownership) matters, 
privatization would seem irrelevant. Thus, the imperative question is to de- 
vise appropriate regulation mechanisms and introduce competition, and 
these design issues are important in developing the next phase of privati- 
zation-namely,  the Private Finance  Initiative (PFI) and other public- 
private partnerships. 
But to the extent that preprivatization restructuring matters, the effect of 
privatization is rather subtle (and would not be picked up in conventional 
regression analysis of company performance).  Restructuring  of public- 
sector firms needs tough decisions (e.g., deciding to close down plants). 
That toughness may come from a strong ministerial personality, but this is 
all too rare. However, it may also come from the threat (or promise) of pri- 
vatization in the future. Thus, privatization is perhaps seen as a credible 
signal of public-sector toughness that politicians cannot otherwise give. 
Furthermore, the fact that privatization has been carried out confers an 
advantage to ministers on the left of the political spectrum: They can now 
credibly commit not to have to intervene in many formerly public-sector 
decisions. This might explain why renationalization has vanished from the 
U.K. Labour government’s agenda, although it has intervened selectively 
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2.2  Public Ownership in the United Kingdom 
In 1979, government-owned firms produced approximately 12 percent 
of GDP. Public ownership predominated in the utilities, transport, and 
the “heavy industries” (i.e., coal, steel, and shipbuilding), although there 
were state-owned companies in other sectors. Table 2.1 shows how the pat- 
tern of public ownership in the United Kingdom developed over time. Since 
there is a longer history of public ownership in the utilities, we begin with 
these. 
Utility public ownership began at the level of local, not national, govern- 
ment. Clean water supplies, and later gas (for lighting), were provided by lo- 
cal councils in some areas and by the private sector in others. Joseph Cham- 
berlain’s “gas and water  socialism,” which gave Birmingham improved 
services in the 1870s, was perhaps the most famous example, but there were 
many others. In the last two decades of the century, when the electricity 
supply industry began to emerge, some areas were served by privately owned 
companies and others by municipal undertakings. The 1882  Electric Light- 
ing Act allowed the local authorities to buy out the private companies (at 
their written-down asset value) after twenty-one years, later extended to 
forty-two years. Unfortunately, this fragmented ownership structure made 
it almost impossible to gain economies of scale, since municipal undertak- 
ings could not expand beyond their boundaries, and the private companies, 
potentially larger, were in practice smaller (Hannah 1979). 
Telephone services were initially also fragmented, but the post office be- 
came a near-national monopoly from 1912 onwards4  At that time, the post 
office was a government department headed by a minister, but it eventually 
became a conventional nationalized industry, a “public corporation,” in 
1969. The possibility of greater state control of the electricity industry to 
solve the problems caused by its fragmentation was discussed soon after 
the first World War, but was rejected. In 1926, however, the government set 
up the Central Electricity Board to construct a national transmission grid 
and allow the industry to gain economies of scale through better coordi- 
nation of (still independent) generating stations. 
Nationalization on a large scale followed the second World War and the 
election of the first majority Labour government. The private electricity 
companies were bought out, and the municipal undertakings transferred 
to central government ownership, in 1947. The gas industry was national- 
ized in a similar manner the following year. The water industry remained a 
mixture of local authority water boards and regulated private companies 
until 1973, when the local authority undertakings in England and Wales 
4. Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council continued to provide its own telephone services. The 
first author used to assume that the civil service had simply forgotten the city when planning 
the reorganization. He now knows that the decision was made because the people of Hull de- 
serve a better service than the rest of the country. Table 2.1  Public Ownership in the United Kingdom 
Industry  Pre-1914  1919-1939  1945-1951  1950s and 1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
- 
Aerospace  P 
Bank of England  P 
Airlines  P; N 1939 
Airports  P; M 
British Petroleum 
Broadcasting (BBC)  P; N 1927 
Cable and wireless (telecoms)  P  N 1938 (Part) 
Coal  P 
Electricity  PM  N  1933 (Grid) 
Gas  P; M 
Oil (North Sea exploration)" 
Ports 
Post Officeb  Govt. Dept. 
P; stake bought 1914 
Railways  P 
Road freight  P 
Rolls-Royce  P 
Shipbuilding  P 
Steel  P 
Telecommunications  P; M; N 1912 
Vehicles (British Leyland)  P 










N 1965 (some) 
Shares sold 1977--1987 
P; stations added 





P 1953; N 1967 
N 1975 


















Notes; Blank cells indicate that the status of the industry in question did not change in the decade in question. M = municipal ownership; P = private ownership; 
N (date) = nationalization in that year; P (date) = privatization in that year (the first sale for companies privatized in tranches); and Govt. Dept. = government 
department. 
"Britoil was set up alongside private-sector oil companies in 1975-no  companies were taken over. 
hThe  government department was transformed into a nationalized industry in 1969, but this was not a change of ownership. 
'Only the municipal water undertakings were nationalized in 1973. 68  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
were reorganized into ten Regional Water Authorities. The private compa- 
nies, which supplied about a quarter of the consumers in England and 
Wales with water, were not affected by this reorganization. 
The postwar Labour government also nationalized a number of nonutil- 
ity industries. The “commanding heights” of coal and steel were national- 
ized in 1946 and 1949, although the steel industry was to be sold back to the 
private sector by the next Conservative government. Similarly, much of the 
long-distance road freight industry was nationalized in 1948, and most of it 
privatized again in the early 1950s. The railways, losing traffic to roads and 
starved of investment during the war, were nationalized in 1948. The British 
Overseas Airways Corporation, including most of the country’s fledgling 
airlines, had been nationalized in 1939. The steel industry was renational- 
ized in 1967, and shipbuilding and aerospace were nationalized in 1977. 
These latter nationalizations were bitterly opposed by the Conservative 
Party, even though the previous Conservative government had effectively 
nationalized Rolls-Royce (aircraft engines). Rescued from bankruptcy, the 
company did not become a public corporation, but it remained a limited 
company with the government as the major shareholder, as did the vehicle 
firm British Leyland, which was rescued a couple of years later. They were 
not the only private companies with substantial government sharehold- 
ings-the  government had taken a strategic stake in British Petroleum be- 
fore the first World War and later acquired Cable and Wireless, which pro- 
vided telecommunications services in a number of (then) British colonies. 
In 1979,  therefore, Britain had a much higher degree of public ownership 
in industry than the United States, but it was not far out of line with the 
pattern in many other European countries. Public ownership of gas and 
electricity was common in Europe (sometimes in the charge of local gov- 
ernment, sometimes central), while government ownership in the United 
States was much more limited (to municipal distribution bodies and the 
New Deal-era  generating boards, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority). 
Telecommunications was usually public in Europe (as in the United King- 
dom) and private in the United States. Public railways and “flag carrier” 
airlines (with smaller private competitors) were common in Europe but not 
in the United States. The United Kingdom had a mixture of public and 
private water suppliers. In the United States, water was (and is) predomi- 
nantly municipal. In France, however, although municipalities  own the 
water assets in their districts, operation is usually contracted out to private 
companies. The United Kingdom was relatively unusual in the number of 
industrial companies in the public sector, including coal, steel, shipbuild- 
ing, and car manufacturing; most companies in these sectors were in the 
private sector in Europe and the United States. However, some industrial 
companies in Europe were state owned, and the Mitterand government in 
France embarked on a large program of nationalization in the early 1980s, 
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How, in practice, did the government control its nationalized industries? 
Most were organized as public corporations, a type of organization in- 
vented for the BBC, which was nationalized in 1927. A public corporation 
is established by an Act of Parliament and governed by a board responsible 
to a minister. The corporation is financially independent of government, 
although any borrowing had to be approved by the Treasury. The Act laid 
down the board’s duties, and, although ministers are allowed to give the 
board general directions, they are meant to keep away from detailed deci- 
sion making.5  Morrison summed up the attitude sought of board members 
when he called upon them to regard themselves as “the high custodians of 
the public interest” (1933, 157). 
It soon became apparent that merely requiring corporations to break 
even, taking one year with another, as most of the nationalization statutes 
did, would lead to an inadequate financial performance. The first step to- 
ward greater control was taken in a 1961 white paper that set out financial 
targets in terms of a target rate of return. A 1967 white paper, which was 
perhaps the high point of economic analysis in the control of nationalized 
industries, required corporations to base their prices on costs at the mar- 
gin and to use a test discount rate of 8 percent (in real terms) in all invest- 
ment appraisals. Financial targets were intended to be compatible with 
these economic rules. In the early 197Os, however, many corporations were 
required to hold down their prices to combat inflation, producing heavy 
losses. Two more white papers were produced, in 1975 and 1978, that con- 
centrated on the financial objectives of safeguarding cash flow and restor- 
ing profitability. 
The 1978 white paper also required ministers to set a range of perfor- 
mance targets for the nationalized industries, including measures such as 
productivity and service standards. This was due to the gradual recogni- 
tion that the industries had not been performing well-their  productivity 
was typically well below that of comparable foreign enterprises and was 
growing too slowly. Labor relations at British Leyland became a national 
joke during the 1970s, and other industries had similar problems. Possible 
reasons for these problems are discussed in the next section. 
2.3  The Rationale for Privatization 
To the extent that privatization is a change in ownership, the private and 
public sectors differ because the public sector has different objectives than 
the private (i.e., broader objectives than profit maximization) and different 
incentives. The different incentives arise because a public-sector firm is not 
5. In practice, ministers almost never gave general directions of the kind envisaged in the 
Acts but intervened far too frequently in matters of detail, even though Morrison (1933, 171) 
had feared that a “mischievous and not too competent minister could easily ruin any business 
undertaking if that were permitted.” 70  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
vulnerable to takeover or bankruptcy and has a different information rela- 
tionship with its owners6 
The textbook argument for public ownership centers on differences in 
objectives between private and public firms. Profit-maximizing firms with 
market power will produce inefficiently low levels of output relative to wel- 
fare-maximizing firms (assuming that costs are independent of owner- 
ship).  Furthermore, many  utilities  have  increasing  returns  and, thus, 
market power. The rationale for public ownership is then clear-namely,  a 
change in objectives to increase social welfare-although  the rationale for 
public ownership of industries without market power is less clear. 
There are at least two problems with this view. First, it is not clear that 
ownership is necessary to obtain a socially optimal output level, since a 
regulator could simply require firms to produce at that necessary level. The 
problem is, of course, that regulators are unlikely to know what the socially 
efficient output level is, but then neither will government. Second, the ap- 
parent inefficiency in public firms (Pryke 1982) suggests relaxing the as- 
sumption that public and private firms have similar costs. Both these argu- 
ments suggest examining productive efficiency in public and private firms. 
There are two main approaches to this. The agency approach to privati- 
zation focuses on the principallagent relationship between the owner and 
a manager (private sector) and government and manager (public sector). 
Assuming that the private sector is more effective at monitoring manage- 
rial activity than the public sector, privatization improves productive effi- 
ciency by ensuring that managers supply effort and keep down costs (Bos 
1990; Rees 1988). This is therefore primarily an argument about the effect 
of incentives on productive efficiency. 
The delegation approach is primarily about the effect of objectives on 
efficiency. It begins with the observation that worker effort is frequently 
bargained  over between  managers and  worker^.^  Furthermore, private 
firms are assumed to maximize profits, whereas the objectives of public- 
sector organizations are a combination of profits, consumer surplus, and 
the welfare of public-sector employees.*  Under various conditions (Haskel 
and Sanchis 1995), it can be shown that the effect of changing objectives 
6. Owners of public firms are voters and ministers, whereas owners of private firms are 
shareholders and managers. 
7. Millward and Stevens (1986, table 9.19) report that. in 1984, 87 percent of nationalized 
industries negotiated with trade unions over working conditions, and 77 percent over man- 
ning levels. 
8. According to former minister John Moore,  as quoted in Martin and Parker (1997, 3), 
“the priorities of elected politicians are different from and often in conflict with the priorities 
of effective business managers. Yet in state-owned industries politicians are in charge, which 
means that whenever politicians cannot resist getting involved in what should be management 
decisions, political priorities take precedence over commercial ones. Politicians may overrule 
commercial judgements in other to build a new factory in an area where voters need jobs, or 
they may refuse to close an uneconomical plant. They can become involved in policies affect- 
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toward profit maximization is to raise effort. The intuition for this result is 
straightforward. Privatization can then be viewed as a way of committing 
the government not to pay high wages, to accept low effort, or both. It is a 
method of delegating authority over wage and effort bargaining for a gov- 
ernment that is unable to commit itself to bargaining at arms’ length with 
the workforce. A union bargaining with a private firm faces, at the margin, 
a firm unwilling to concede to demands for high wages and low eff~rt.~ 
Both models would predict relatively high employment and low effort 
before privatization.  Similarly, any liberalization of markets raises effort. 
Note, too, that while privatization shifts the objectives of the public-sector 
firms toward profit maximization, this process may take place before pri- 
vate ownership is instituted. This may be important  empirically in the U.K. 
case, since, typically in the United Kingdom, more commercially orien- 
tated managers were brought in while firms were still in the public sector. 
Privatization of natural monopolies will usually require regulation. Cost 
of  capital  regulation-common  in  the  United  States,  for example-is 
likely to lead to overcapitalization (Averch and Johnson 1962). The regu- 
lation of prices faces a fundamental trade-off: profit regulation gives firms 
little incentive to reduce costs but may keep prices more aligned with mar- 
ginal costs, whereas price cap regulation gives ample incentives for cost re- 
duction at the cost of a possible wedge between prices and marginal costs. 
Furthermore, dynamic price cap regulation faces the problem of resetting 
the price cap. As we document later, proponents of the first U.K. price cap 
scheme believed this dynamic problem to be of academic interest only since 
they expected that competition would arrive before the price cap had to be 
reset. In reality, if resetting the price cap involves looking at profits, then 
price cap  regulation becomes de facto profit regulation (Beesley and Littie- 
child 1989). 
It is often argued that competition is not feasible in natural monopolies. 
However, it is worth noting that, first, such arguments generally refer to 
competition within the market, but competition for the market, such as rail 
franchises (or more generally contracting out), is often feasible. Second, on 
close examination, natural monopolies often consist of parts where com- 
petition is indeed not feasible (e.g., transmission of electricity and railway 
lines) and others where it is feasible (e.g., generation of electricity and en- 
ergy retailing), and the privatization and restructuring process can take 
account of this. Third, with technical change, the technology that causes 
9. The complication here is that the result depends on the functional form of the utility 
function. If workers care a good deal about effort but not wages, they may agree to wage cuts 
after privatization. If such cuts are deep enough, then effort can even fall. See Haskel and San- 
chis (1995) for discussion. 
10. The agency model is usually cast in terms of managerial effort, and the effect on em- 
ployment is seldom derived. The delegation model obtains specific predictions on overem- 
ployment and undereffort (see Haskel and Szymanski 1992; Haskel and Sanchis 1995). 72  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
natural monopoly can cease to be of such great importance (e.g., the devel- 
opment of mobile phones). Finally, competition can become part of regu- 
lation. Yardstick competition (Shleifer 1985) regulates a firm by making 
prices (e.g., in a firm with the monopoly of a particular region) dependent 
on other regions’ costs, thus providing good incentives for cost reduction.” 
Finally, the regulation of quality of service has become an important fac- 
tor in the U.K. debate. Such an issue amply illustrates the information 
problems confronting the regulator. Since it is impossible for the regulator 
to write complete contracts specifying all dimensions of quality, firms can 
neglect nonregulated quality dimensions. 
2.4  Privatization in the United Kingdom since 1979 
In 1975, Margaret Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party. 
The party had supported the corporatist consensus of the 1950s and 1960s 
and had expanded the state’s role in industry by taking over Rolls-Royce 
and British Leyland. Thatcher and her advisors gradually became deter- 
mined to move away from this consensus, which they saw as  responsible for 
the country’s relative decline. They planned to introduce “free-market’’ 
policies that would reduce the role of the state in the economy. Private en- 
terprise was not only believed to be more efficient than state provision; 
many thought it was morally superior. 
The Conservatives also sought to reduce trade union power, which was 
strongest in the nationalized industries. In 1974,  the National Union of Mine- 
workers, working for the dominant state-owned mining industry, called a 
national strike for better pay. The resulting power cuts caused the Conser- 
vative Prime Minister at the time, Edward Heath, to call an election under 
the slogan “who governs Britain?” He lost the election and, later, the lead- 
ership of his party. In opposition, in 1978, the Conservatives’ Ridley Re- 
portI2  argued that where industries “have the nation by the jugular vein the 
only feasible option is to pay up.” John Moore, who later became Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, was to say that “Public Sector trade unions have 
been extraordinarily successful in gaining advantages for themselves in the 
pay hierarchy by  exploiting their monopoly collective bargaining  posi- 
tion. . . . Privatisation . . . makes it possible to link pay to success and to 
provide appropriate rewards” (as quoted in Kay and Thompson 1986). 
1  I. While competition might improve productive efficiency, a more difficult  question is 
whether this by itself improves welfare. No one disputes that welfare improves if competition 
aligns prices closer to marginal costs, but if it simply reduces costs, then this does not neces- 
sarily raise welfare since it may just be a transfer of welfare from managers (who may have to 
work harder) to consumers (who get lower prices). Yardstick competition is a case in which 
welfare is increased, since splitting a firm into many units expands the information base upon 
which to write contracts. Auctions are also likely to be welfare-improving since they reveal 
what was privatc information (on all this, see Vickers 1995). 
12. Nicholas Ridley. MP, chaired a Conservative study group whose unpublished report 
was leaked to The Economist (“Appomattox or civil war,” 27 May 1978, pp. 21-22). Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  73 
In the light of subsequent developments, it is interesting to note that the 
word “privatization” does not appear in the Conservative Manifesto for 
the 1979 election. The party pledged to sell the National Freight Corpora- 
tion (the rump of the road-haulage industry that had not been denation- 
alized in the 1950s) and some of the companies owned by  the National 
Enterprise  Board  (a  Labour  creation  designed to provide finance for 
industrial investment). During the election, the party also proposed the 
sale of British Airways. The most eye-catching commitment, however, was 
to allow council-house tenants to buy their own homes, with discounts 
reflecting the length of time they had been living there. This proved to be a 
very popular policy, with more than  1.5 million homes sold to date, or 
roughly 25 percent of the 1979 stock of 6.5 million council houses. The ar- 
guments for this policy were not primarily economic, however, and its 
effect on economic efficiency is likely to be limited, as discussed by Gregg, 
Machin, and Manning (chap. 9 in this volume). 
With no plans for large-scale privatizations, in the early 1980s the gov- 
ernment began to sell shares in the private companies that it owned. The 
1980 Civil Aviation Act allowed the government to turn British Airways 
from a public corporation into a limited company suitable for privatiza- 
tion, but it started to incur huge losses due to the recession in the airline 
industry, and  a sale was clearly inappropriate.13 The National  Freight 
Corporation was also suffering in the recession, but it was bought by  a 
consortium of managers, employees, and pensioners who believed that the 
company was about to turn around. Helped by the sale of some of its sur- 
plus property, it did so. Nevertheless, privatization was proceeding on a 
small scale and was not a major political issue.14 
All this was to change with the privatization of British Telecommunica- 
tions (BT). During the 1970s, BT had built up a backlog of investment, in 
part due to previous misguided decisions on the right technology to adopt 
(Gala1 et al. 1994). The main  reason, however, was the tight  external 
financing limit that controlled the amount that BT could borrow from 
the government. In the early 198Os, macroeconomic policy was based upon 
the medium-term financial strategy, which depended on reductions in the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) to reduce the money supply 
and hence inflation. Under Treasury accounting rules, BT’s  investment 
would add directly to the PSBR. Various attempts were made to finance the 
investment outside the PSBR, and all fell foul of the “Ryrie rules” that de- 
termined whether a transaction should be counted as public spending. In 
13. British Airways became profitable a few years later, but its privatization was delayed by 
legal action concerning the demise of Laker Airways, which went bankrupt during the reces- 
sion, alleging that other airlines, BA among them, had engaged in predatory pricing. The mat- 
ter was settled out of (U.S.)  court, after which BA was sold. 
14. The sale of Amersham International in February 1982 attracted some controversy when 
the shares rose by 32 percent on the first day of trading, giving large profits to some investors, 
but most voters probably remained blissfully unaware of this. 74  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
the end, privatizing BT seemed to be the only way to finance the investment 
within the government’s self-imposed macroeconomic constraints. 
The privatization of 5 1.2 percent of BT would be the largest share sale 
ever seen on the London Stock Exchange, however. The government’s ad- 
visors doubted that the financial sector would be able to absorb the new 
shares. The only possibility seemed to be to offer shares to the general 
public in the hope that they could mop up the excess. A new kind of ad- 
vertising campaign was designed,15  and the shares were sold in November 
1984. The advertising proved extremely successful: the issue was greatly 
oversubscribed, and when trading started on December 3 the shares closed 
at a premium of 33 percent to the offer price.I6 
From this time onward, a significant part of the electorate saw privati- 
zation as an easy way  to make money,I7 and the policy acquired a large 
number of supporters. It soon seemed as if the only obstacle to privatizing 
a company was finding a place in the queue, since the government had to 
leave an interval after each major sale in order to allow investors to find 
money for their next purchase. As the recession of the early 1980s abated, 
state-owned companies that had been making huge losses became suffi- 
ciently profitable for privatization. Table 2.2 shows the major events affect- 
ing a selection of these companies, while table 2.3  records the more impor- 
tant sales. By May 1997, when the Conservatives lost power, very few firms 
remained in public ownership, and some of those became candidates for 
privatization under the Labour government. In most cases, privatization 
has meant the end of specific state involvement in the formerly national- 
ized firms. Some in ailing industries, such as coal and shipbuilding, have 
continued to receive state aid, although this is  restricted  by  European 
Union rules (Besley and Seabright 2000). The Rover Group, formerly British 
Leyland, has changed hands twice since it was sold to British Aerospace, 
15. Only an investment advisor can legally recommend that someone should buy a partic- 
ular share, so the campaign could do  no more than tell people that the sale was taking place- 
while also introducing many of them to the whole concept of share ownership. 
16. Small shareholders who bought with the intention of selling their shares quickly made 
an even greater profit because the offer price was payable in three installments, and the rise 
represented  86 percent of the first installment. The phrase “stagging” soon entered the na- 
tional vocabulary. 
17. The shares of privatized companies generally outperformed the stock market in the pe- 
riod immediately after their privatization-the  twenty-three companies that are still quoted 
on the stock market today outperformed the Financial  Times all-share index by 43 percent 
(unweighted average) in the two years after their privatization. Kay (2001) has pointed out, 
however, that twenty-two of these twenty-three companies subsequently underperformed the 
market by an average of 39 percent (“More Brickbats  than Bouquets,” Financial Times, 7 Feb- 
ruary 17).  The unweighted average performance from privatization to the end of 2000 is a loss 
of 15 percent relative to the all-share index. Individual figures range from a gain of 131 per- 
cent (Forth Ports) to a loss of 83 percent (British SteeUCorus). Kay suggests that this reflects 
the difficulties of truly transforming a nationalized industry into a private company, difficul- 
ties that only gradually became apparent. A gradual toughening of regulation and the very 
mixed record of diversifying acquisitions by privatized companies will also have affected their 
performance. Table 2.2  Events in Key Nationalized Industries 
Privatization  Restructured  Subject to 




1965  1985  1987  Yes 
1939  1979  1982  1987  1988 merger with British Caledonian 
1997 EU liberalization completed 
1998 contracts with ESI ended 
1988 MMC report on large users 
1993 MMC report on entire industry 
1997 British Gas splits itself in two 



























Partly  1984, 1991  1985 interconnection  determination 
1989 price controls reviewed 
199  1 duopoly review 
1994  -1 995 REC price controls tightened 
1995 first REC mergers 
1990-1998  1994 Generators’ undertakings 
Slowly  1994 price controls reviewed 
Electricity  1948  1987  1983, 1990  1990-199 1  Partly 
Water Authorities  1973  1986  1983,1988  1989  Yes 
Notes: British Caledonian was then the second largest U.K. carrier. The MMC is the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, REC is a regional electricity com- 
pany (a local electricity distributor), EU is the European Union, and ESI is the electricity supply industry. 76  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Table 2.3  Maior Privatizations in the United Kingdom 
Company 
Float or 
Private Sale  Date 
Proceeds (Emillions; 
net of debt issuekancellation) 
Current Prices  2000 Prices 
British Petroleum 
British Aerospace 
Cable and Wireless 
National Freight Consortium 
Amersham International 
Britoil 












Regional electricity companies 
National Power and PowerGen 
Scottish electricity companies 
Northern Ireland Electricity 
Coal 
Rail stock leasing companies 
Railtrack 
British Energy (nuclear) 
F  1977-1987 
F  1981-1985 
F  1981-1985 
PS  1981 
F  1982 
F  1982-1985 
F  1983-1984 
F  1984 
F  1984 
F  1984-1 993 
F  1986 
F  1987 
PS  1987 
F  1987 
F  1987 
PS  1988 
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F  1989 
F  1990 
F  1991-1 995 
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PS 
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F  1996 
F  1996 





















































Source: Pollitt (1999). 
Nute: Dashes indicate that amount is negligible. 
and it narrowly escaped closure in 2000, causing a major political row. The 
government and its agents have continued to play a major role in the de- 
velopment of one group of the privatized industries, however. These are the 
utilities, and we now turn to consider them. 
2.5  The Privatized Utilities 
The 1979 Conservative Manifesto had not suggested that any utilities 
would be privatized, but once BT’s privatization had proved a political suc- 
cess, the government started to look upon the other utilities as possible 
candidates for privatization. In April  1985, the government announced 
that British Gas would be sold, and the company became the second pri- 
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None of these privatizations involved significant restructuring of the firms 
to be sold. The government had hoped that competition would develop in 
gas and telecommunications, but the process was very slow in the face of 
dominant, unrestructured  incumbents. Not until the electricity industry 
was reorganized in 1990 did the privatization  process involve the signifi- 
cant restructuring of an industry in order to promote effective competi- 
tion. The railways were also restructured, in a more complicated process, 
and were privatized between 1994 and 1997. 
The government recognized that it would be inappropriate to privatize 
the utilities as unregulated monopolies. The telecommunications industry 
had been opened up to competition in 1982 when the government gave 
Mercury a licence to build its own network in competition with BT. The 
hope was that this competition would soon be sufficient protection for con- 
sumers, but in the short term some regulation was needed. Thus, the first 
concern was to devise an appropriate regulatory system to restrain the 
company’s behavior until competition became effective. At the same time, 
the government was conscious  that the  opposition  Labour  Party was 
deeply opposed to privatization. Thus, the second matter was to ensure 
that a future Labour government could not interfere with the regulatory 
system in order to disadvantage the company. 
To cope with the second issue, the government established an indepen- 
dent regulator, the Director General of Telecommunications, with statu- 
tory duties that required the regulator to ensure that the company could 
finance  its activities. The details of the company’s regulation were en- 
shrined in its licence, a contract that could only be revoked with twenty-five 
years’ notice. Under English law, contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. 
The regulator would be allowed to impose a change against the wishes of 
the company, however, if the matter was referred to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC; the United Kingdom’s competition author- 
ity, now  the Competition  Commission) and the MMC supported  the 
change. The regulator was also subject to  judicial review of his or her deci- 
sion making. If the company felt that the regulator had not followed the 
proper procedures or that the decision taken was manifestly unreason- 
able,18 it could ask a court to review the matter. This system of checks and 
balances was designed to protect the company’s interests while ensuring 
that the regulator could still control its behavior (Levy and Spiller 1994). 
What was this independent regulator expected to regulate while waiting 
for effective competition? At first, the Treasury had suggested a modified 
version of U.S.-style rate-of-return  regulation, which would set a maxi- 
mum rate of return but no minimum. This was intended to give the com- 
pany  stronger incentives  for cost efficiency than a pure rate-of-return 
18. Note that judicial review does not ask whether a decision was actually right or wrong, 
but whether it was unreasonable, which is less of a constraint on the regulator. 78  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
scheme, under which the company could appeal for higher prices if its costs 
rose and depressed its rate of return. When Alan Walters, the Prime Min- 
ister’s economic advisor,  suggested  an alternative-namely,  an output- 
related levy on profits (which was designed to give the company an in- 
centive  to keep  prices  low,  since  the  levy  rate  would  fall  as output 
rose)-Stephen  Littlechild (then a professor of economics at the Univer- 
sity of Birmingham and later the U.K. electricity regulator) was commis- 
sioned to decide between the two schemes. He came up with a third: a lo- 
cal tariff reduction scheme, under which a basket of BT’s prices (in the 
markets with the least competition) would have to fall by a preset amount 
in real terms each year. In nominal terms, they could rise by (RPI-X) per- 
cent, where RPS was the change in the retail price index and Xwas the pre- 
set real reduction, and this soon became the nickname for the scheme. Lit- 
tlechild (1 983) saw the scheme as a temporary expedient until competition 
became effective in holding prices down, because if  it was needed for a 
permanent control, it would be necessary to reset the level of X  from time 
to time. This could not sensibly be done without looking at the company’s 
costs and profits, which would blur the distinction between his scheme and 
rate-of-return regulation. In practice, RPI-X, or price cap, regulation was 
later adopted for every other utility privatization, including those in which 
there was little prospect of competition (table 2.2). 
The RPI-X  regulation limits price increases for a basket of goods to X 
percent below the rise in the retail price index, with X  being set by the reg- 
ulator for a period of four or five years at a time. This system does away 
with the nationalized industry policy of tying prices to marginal costs in fa- 
vor of providing strong incentives for cost reduction, since firms can keep 
any profits they make as long as they do  not exceed the price cap. Thus, the- 
oretically RPI-Xshould promote productivity improvement. In practice, a 
number of problems have emerged with the system. The first issue relates 
to the rebalancing of relative prices. If the company faces competition for 
some regulated services, it will have an incentive to reduce their prices. Do- 
ing so will relax the constraint on its other prices and thereby weaken the 
regulator’s control of its activities as a monopolist. In the case of BT, an ex- 
plicit constraint on domestic line rentals was introduced to limit the scope 
for this rebalancing, but other industries have not faced such constraints. 
The second point relates to quality. For BT, for example, there were initially 
no quality controls, and it was widely perceived that quality had deterio- 
rated. Explicit quality targets have now been introduced. Finally, Beesley 
and Littlechild (1989) characterize the initial choice of Xas  the outcome of 
a bargain between incumbent managers and government. Managers were 
in a position to  hold up the privatization process that politicians were anx- 
ious to speed along, and they often obtained favorable values of Xas  a re- 
sult. Since then, in reviews, regulation has been set more toughly, but if X 
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regulation is in danger of becoming like rate-of-return regulation with all 
the attendant incentive problems. 
Some of these problems can be reduced by  using yardstick regulation 
(Shleifer 1985). In its pure form, this suggests that the price allowed for one 
company is based on the average of its rivals’ costs, breaking the link be- 
tween the company’s price and its own costs while still allowing it to offset 
industrywide movements in costs. The existing regional structure of the 
water industry and of electricity distribution allowed the adoption of yard- 
stick competition, but in a slightly different form. In practice, the U.K.  reg- 
ulators use yardstick comparisons to assess the efficiency of each company 
in their industry and, hence, to predict the cost savings that each company 
might make over the next four or five years. The company’s price control is 
based on the regulator’s forecast of the company’s costs (Waddams Price 
1999). However, as well as predicting operating costs, in practice, regula- 
tors also have to predict the company’s investment needs. Since the amount 
of investment needed depends on the state of each company’s infrastruc- 
ture, which is private information, regulators are compelled to rely on the 
company’s own reports. This reintroduces scope for opportunistic behav- 
ior and bargaining between the regulator and the company. 
The water regulator has placed the greatest stress upon yardstick tech- 
niques, asking the MMC to block mergers that would have reduced the 
number of water and sewerage companies to cornpare.l9 Despite this, a 
large number of the smaller water-only companies have been acquired, 
either by water and sewerage companies or by international groups. The 
electricity regulator has placed rather less stress on yardstick comparisons, 
in part because the fourteen companies in the industry did not allow much 
scope for formal statistical analysis. So far, mergers between electricity dis- 
tribution networks (five to date) have not been blocked. 
Figure 2.1 shows the development of prices in the main regulated utili- 
ties. In each case, the price level at privatization is taken as 100. The first 
company to be privatized with an RPI-Xconstraint was BT-in  this case, 
X was set at 3 for five years. When he wrote the report proposing RPI-X, 
Littlechild (1983) seems to have envisaged that competition would develop 
so rapidly that regulation would not be needed after this initial period. 
That hope proved too optimistic, and the price control has been reset four 
times so far, with larger X values each time.20  British Gas was the second 
company to be privatized, and the price cap for gas transportation has also 
19. The MMC (1995) estimated that losing one water company through a merger would 
cause losses, due to the increased difficulty in making comparisons, with a present discounted 
value of between E50m and E250m. 
20. Strictly speaking, when Xwas reset in 1996, the value chosen was lower than before, but 
it applied to a smaller bundle of services with prices that had been rising in relative terms. The 
regulator claimed that the headline cap of RPI-4.5 would have the same effect on those prices 
as a cap of RPI-8.5, applied to the company as a whole, and then subjected to the same de- 
gree of rebalancing. 80  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
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Fig. 2.1  Regulated prices in the United Kingdom 
declined continuously since privatization. The cost of gas, which also fell 
dramatically in the years after privatization, was a separate pass-through 
element in the cap and is not shown in the figure. Both companies have 
been able to reduce their costs at least as rapidly as their price caps re- 
quired, and have been highly profitable. 
The first price caps implied real-price reductions, but the transmission- 
price cap for the National Grid Company (NGC) implied constant prices, 
while most of the Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) were allowed 
small real increases in their distribution charges for several years. NGC’s 
cap was first reset roughly two years after privatization and was only tight- 
ened to a small extent, but by the time the RECs’ price caps were reset, in 
1994, the companies had reduced their costs significantly and were very 
profitable. When BT’s profits were above the level that the regulator thought 
necessary, he had tightened the company’s price control to reduce profits 
in a gradual manner, allowing the company to keep the benefits of its extra 
productivity for a longer period and maintaining incentives for future re- 
ductions. The electricity regulator, in contrast, believed that the RECs’ 
profits were so exceptional that a one-off price cut could be justified with- 
out affecting their incentives for future price reductions. The regulator pro- 
posed a one-off price reduction averaging 14 percent, but had to follow it 
with a further  11 percent the next year amid widespread criticism of his 
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one-off cut, implying that the companies continued to cut costs by more 
than the regulator had expected in 1995. Over time, regulators have come 
to release far more information during the process of reviewing a price con- 
trol-including  predictions of the companies’ costs (on which the control 
will be based)-in  part to ensure that the companies and commentators do 
not comment adversely because they are surprised by the level chosen. 
The water industry has been allowed significant real price increases since 
its privatization. This is largely because of the need to finance new invest- 
ment in higher quality; indeed, the desire to keep this investment away from 
the PSBR  was one of  the motives for the privatization. Although the 
steadily rising prices might imply that there have been few efficiency gains, 
the regulator pointed out that efficiency improvements actually halved the 
price increases that would otherwise have been required between 1995 and 
2000. In fact, the companies did better than the regulator expected, and so 
the latest price control, scheduled to start in 2000, started with a one-off cut 
to finance additional investment before the prices rose again. Thus, figure 
2.1 is consistent with improvements in efficiency in all of these industries. 
2.5.1  Competition 
An alternative to regulation is competition, although it is increasingly 
felt to be desirable to introduce competition as part of regulation (Schma- 
lensee 1989). Restructuring was strongly resisted by the incumbent man- 
agements, and so little restructuring occurred in the initial utility privati- 
zations. Before electricity  generation and the railways were privatized, 
however, they were restructured to introduce competition. 
In the case of electricity generation, the Central Electricity Generating 
Board was split into a transmission company and three generating compa- 
nies. Two  of these generators were privatized  in  1991, whereas nuclear 
power remained in state ownership until  1996, when the newer stations 
were privatized. The generators competed to sell power to electricity sup- 
pliers (and thence to consumers) in a wholesale market organized around 
the Electricity Pool, which took daily price bids from every power station 
and selected the cheapest ones. The two largest generators controlled 70 
percent of the industry’s capacity in 1990, however, and clearly had the 
ability to raise prices above competitive levels (Green and Newbery 1997). 
One response to this was entry by new stations, mostly gas fired, which has- 
tened the decline of the coal industry. A second was pressure from the reg- 
ulator to keep prices down, which eventually led the major generators to 
divest some of their plant. Taken together, entry and the divestitures have 
created a more balanced market structure, but the limited amount of com- 
petition in the initial market structure meant that prices were higher than 
they needed to have been for several years. By 2002, however, surplus ca- 
pacity and a more competitive market structure had depressed wholesale 82  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
electricity prices to the extent that several generators faced severe financial 
troubles, and the government  organized a financial rescue package for 
British Energy. The privatization did introduce rules for separating the dis- 
tribution of electricity from its retail sale (supply), which allowed cus- 
tomers to choose their supplier. The incumbents rapidly lost market share 
among larger customers, bringing the margins on serving them down to 
competitive levels. 
The railways were split into even more pieces before their privatization. 
Railtrack, which was floated in May 1996, owned the track network and 
most stations but did not run any services. Instead, the services were split 
up into more than twenty franchises, which were let out for periods of be- 
tween seven and fifteen years by the franchising director. Some franchisees 
required subsidies from the government (typically declining over time), 
while others (particularly the intercity routes) were able to pay for their 
franchises. It is difficult to replace a franchisee who owns a large amount 
of sunk capital, and so three rolling stock companies were created, which 
lease trains to the franchisees for the duration of their franchises. In prac- 
tice, however, the rolling stock companies have been reluctant to invest 
without commitments from the train-operating companies. Some of the 
first franchises are now being renewed, and the new contracts are likely to 
last longer. This should allow for more investment but may reduce the com- 
petitive pressure on the franchisees. 
Railtrack, however, was placed in administration by the government in 
October 2001 and replaced by a company limited by guarantee, Network 
Rail, in October 2002. Railtrack’s current and predicted future costs had 
risen rapidly after a major accident at Hatfield in October 2000 (discussed 
later) and had exposed a maintenance backlog, and its predicted revenue 
streams were inadequate to finance these. Rather than finding additional 
revenues (which must, ultimately, come from either the rail traveller or the 
Treasury), the government decided to replace Railtrack with a new organ- 
ization. Instead of  shareholders, Network Rail has about 100 members 
(rail companies, organizations with an interest in the rail industry, and in- 
dividuals) to  whom its board will report at annual general meetings, but the 
company will not pay dividends. The structure was carefully designed to 
ensure that Network Rail’s borrowings will not count against the PSBR, 
but it does represent a move away from the previous philosophy that “stan- 
dard” public  limited  companies would  normally  give the  best  perfor- 
mance.2’ 
It is also possible to introduce competition without restructuring an in- 
dustry, although this is often less effective since it may leave the incumbent 
21. A similar organization, Glas Cymru, took over in May 2001 the assets of Welsh Water 
public limited company. which also faced problems financing future investment. Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  83 
in a position to harm entrants. Perhaps the earliest example of this type 
of  liberalization was  the deregulation  of  interurban  coaching in  1980 
(Thompson and Whitfield 1995).  Until 1980, the sole licensed operator was 
National Express. The 1980 Transport Act allowed entry subject only to 
quality standards, and large-scale entry took place, with substantial price 
reductions (see following discussion). However, the wave of new entrants 
did not survive long, and by 1983 National Express was practically the sole 
operator on the English and Welsh routes (competition remained on the 
Scottish routes). The U.K. and European Union (EU) air routes have also 
been  deregulated, following initiatives from the U.K. government and 
Brussels (see Abbot and Thompson 1989; McGowan and Seabright 1989). 
There has been some entry here, but again the incumbents appear mainly 
to have held their own. 
Another example of the failure of competition to develop unaided was 
the gas industry. At privatization, rival suppliers were given permission to 
enter the market. However, they would need to buy gas from North Sea op- 
erators, who sold most of their output to British Gas (and were presumably 
reluctant to upset their major customer), and then ship it through British 
Gas’s pipes-at  charges set by  British Gas-to  gas consumers with indi- 
vidual, confidential, contracts. Practically no entry occurred, presumably 
because  rival suppliers feared  that, while they  were negotiating trans- 
portation charges with British Gas, that company would make selective 
price reductions to their chosen customers. In 1988, the MMC ordered 
British Gas to provide more information on transportation charges, to sell 
to all its consumers on published tariffs, and to buy no more than 90 per- 
cent of any new gas field, thus allowing rivals access to gas and to the in- 
formation they would need to compete with the company. Even these mea- 
sures, however, only allowed a very gradual development of competition. 
It was not until the early 1990s, when British Gas negotiated specific (and 
rapidly declining) targets for its market share and took several steps to help 
rival suppliers, that competition really took off. Eventually, following a 
second reference to the MMC, the government decided to allow all gas 
consumers to choose their supplier. Roughly a third of domestic gas con- 
sumers now buy from another company (very often their local electricity 
company), in part because the regulator allowed British Gas to set prices 
that recover most of the costs of past gas purchases at what had become 
above-market prices, while new suppliers based their prices on the lower 
prices then in effect.22 
The main question regarding competition is whether new firms consti- 
tute a sufficient threat to incumbents and so force price reductions and 
22. The electricity regulator returned the favor and allowed entrants to undercut the in- 
cumbents in electricity as well. The largest entrant is British Gas. 84  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
quality improvements. In the industries considered here, this requires them 
to have access to essential facilities that were previously controlled by the 
incumbents, given the sunk costs of recreating these facilities. In the case 
of gas, the pipeline network is (literally) the sunk cost. In the U.K. coach- 
ing market, the physical facilities of the Central London coach terminal 
owned by the incumbent might have been recreated at moderate cost but 
not the network benefits of being able to change between so many routes at 
one place. To obtain these benefits, an entrant denied access to the termi- 
nal might have had to set up a national route network, making small-scale 
entry impossible (Thompson and Whitfield 1995). British Airways (BA), 
which has grandfathered rights to many of the choice Heathrow Airport 
landing and take-off slots, also gains from network externalities. Low-cost 
entrants operating from other airports have been able to compete for pas- 
sengers who do not wish to change planes at a busy hub, and policymakers 
have been considering  ways of reducing  BA's  dominance  at Heathrow 
(such as U.S.-style slot auctions). Experience suggests, however, that the 
success of liberalization depends crucially on not endowing the incumbent 
public firm with advantages on access to essential facilities. 
2.6  The Effect of Privatization 
This section reviews the evidence on the effects of privatization on pro- 
ductive efficiency, product quality, public-sector union power, and atti- 
tudes toward privatization. Beginning with efficiency, the ideal experiment 
would presumably be to privatize randomly a set of firms and to observe 
the difference in their efficiency after privatization in comparison with a 
control group. In practice, one cannot do this, and so the following issues 
arise in trying to  judge the effect of privatization on efficiency. 
First, what is a good measure of efficiency? Labor productivity is one 
widely used measure. It has, however, a number of drawbacks. First, there 
have been widespread falls in labor input following privatization and hence 
substitution to capital (Haskel and Szymanski 1992). Second, capital in- 
vestment rose after privatization in most firms. For example, in the data 
that we describe later, in the case of BT and British Gas, investment during 
the period after privatization averaged 20 percent more than the level be- 
tween 1979 and privatization. In the case of British Steel, the increase after 
privatization was 50 percent, although even this left investment at a third 
of its level during the 1970s. British Airways' investment doubled soon af- 
ter privatization and doubled again in the late 1990s, linked to the expo- 
nential growth of air travel. The coal industry is the only industry in our 
sample in which investment was lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s, and 
this was due to the secular decline of the industry. 
Third, many companies have replaced direct labor with contractors, and 
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between output and labor input.” Fourth, value added per worker would 
increase if a privatized company used market power to increase its mark- 
ups. We have attempted to use physical measures of output wherever pos- 
sible in our own study. 
Thus, total factor productivity (TFP) would appear to be preferable, al- 
though factor shares may not reflect output elasticities if firms have mar- 
ket power, so that if market power changes with privatization, then mea- 
sured TFP may change for reasons not related to efficiency. One solution 
to this problem is to regress real output changes on input changes, al- 
though sufficient time series is required to avoid imposing the same output 
elasticities across firms. In practice, however, most studies look at TFP. 
Second, privatization is likely to be endogenous, especially since many 
firms were explicitly restructured in order to be privatized and could not be 
sold until they had become more efficient and profitable. Thus, one must at 
least examine preprivatization performance. Whether this restructuring is 
due to privatization is a difficult issue since one might argue that it was only 
the threat of privatization that provided a credible commitment to restruc- 
ture. Third, many privatizations, like that of British Gas, are of the whole 
industry, and thus one has no suitable control group. International com- 
parisons are potentially valuable here, and if, for example, regional ac- 
counts are available pre- and postprivatization, internal comparisons can 
be made. Unfortunately, privatization frequently tends to render regional 
accounts commercially sensitive and thus confidential, and so rather few 
publicly available studies have been undertaken in practice. 
All this suggests looking at a variety of national and international evi- 
dence. Beginning with U.K. evidence, the upper panel of table 2.4 shows 
multicompany and single-company studies. Pryke’s (1  982) study, despite 
not being about privatization, is included since it was one of the first au- 
thoritative studies to document low efficiency and productivity in public- 
sector enterprises. Bishop and Kay (1989) was an early study that looked 
at TFP  growth for a number of firms in the 1979 public sector. They did not 
explicitly study what happened to firms after privatization but rather com- 
pared TFP growth between 1979-1983 and 1983-1988, and they observed 
strong TFP growth, particularly in steel, gas, and coal, in the second pe- 
riod, (Note that this was before steel and coal were privatized.) Bishop and 
Thompson (1992) compared TFP  in 1970-1980 and 1980-1989 with simi- 
lar findings. In an update to the study, Bishop and Green (1995) found a 
23. The most extreme example of this is Railtrack, which had  11,204 employees on 31 
March 2000 but contracted out its track maintenancc services. The prime contractors also 
used subcontractors, and there were more than 2,000 registered railway infrastructure com- 
panies with between 15,000 and 19,000 permanent staff, and a total pool of 84,000 registered 
workers, often recruited on a temporary basis through employment agencies (Juliette Jowitt, 
“Why an Accident  Like Hatfield Was Waiting to Happen,” Financial  Times, 22 February 
2001, p. 4). To get a more complete picture, we should look at total costs or total factor pro- 
ductivity, including services purchased as an input. Table 2.4  Studies of Privatization and Regulation Effects 
Findings: Productivity Rises with . . . 
Privatization 
Measure of  Companies 









(  1 992) 
Bishop and 
Green (1995) 
TFP  None 
TFPgrowth  None 
YIL  KIL. competition, 




TFP  growth  None 
TFP  growth  None 
Mulricompuny Studies 
BAA, BCoal, BGas,  1960-1979  ~ 
BRail, BSteel, BT, 
Electricity, PO 
BAA, BCoal, BGas,  1979-1983. 
BRail, BSteel, BT,  1983-1988 
Electricity, PO 
BAA, BCoal. BGas,  1972-1989  No 
BRail, BSteel, BT, 
Electricity, PO, BA, 
Water, LRT. STG 
BAA, BCoal, BGas,  1970-1980, 
BRdd, BSteel, BT,  19x0-1990 
Electricity, PO 
BAA, BCoal. BGas,  1979-1981,  - 
BRail. BSteel, BT.  1983-1988, 
Electricity, PO  1989-1994 
~  ~  -.  Preprivatization study; found 
slow TFP  growth relative to 
whole economy 
postprivatization,  or regulation 
Yes  No  -  No specific study of pre- and 






No specific study of pre- and 
postprivati7ation or regulation 
.-  No specific study of pre- and 
postprivatization or regulation Martin and 
Parker (I  997) 
O’Mahony 






Price (1  999) 
Tilley and 
Weyman 
Jones  (1 999) 




YIL  Other countries 
TFP  None 
Labor  None 
productivity 
Frontier  Inputs 
estimation 
BGas, BSteel, BT, BA 
Sectors: gas, electri-  1965-1995  Yes 
city, water 
Individual  Company Studies 
Gas  1980-1992  - 
Water  1980-1995  - 
Electricity  Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Postprivatization slowdown in 
BGas, BSteel, BT  speedup in 
BA 
Industry data, changes are after 
1990 so no specific correlation 
with actual event (e.g., regulation) 
-  Comparison of different regions 
shows regions not catching up 
(BGas privatized as a whole) 
~  Yes  -  Real turnover per hour (water 
industry is confidential data) 
-  No catching up of regional firms 
Notes: Findings: Productivity rises column, “Yes” indicates that the study examines the effect on efficiency of the column heading and finds a significant effect; “No” indicates investi- 
gation but no significant effect; and the dashes indicate that the column heading was not investigated. LRT = London Regional Transport; STG = Scottish Transport Group; PO = 
Post Office; BCoal = British Coal; BGas = British Gas; BRail = British Rail; BSteel = British Steel; Y/L  = output-labor ratio; KIL = capital-labor ratio. 88  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
strong TFP growth performance in 1989-1994  in BT and the post office, 
with slow growth in British Airports Authority (BAA), British Gas, British 
Coal, and British Rail. They attribute BT’s strong growth to technical in- 
novation and the growth of the post office (which is still publicly owned) to 
a combination of growth-exploiting economies of scale and restructuring. 
All in all, both studies show productivity increases in advance of privati- 
zation. 
Haskel  and Szymanski (1992)  attempted to control for some of  the 
different factors that might affect productivity. Using panel data on output 
and inputs for twelve U.K. firms that were publicly owned in  1979, they 
attempted to measure factors such as demand, union and market power, 
and so forth. As well as identifying the date of privatization and regula- 
tion, they also attempted to look at preprivatization effects. First, they tried 
to identify the dates of restructuring (e.g., new teams of managers being 
brought  in,  or the  company being  reoriented  toward  more profitable 
goals). Second, they identified the dates when it was first announced that 
the company would be privatized. There were four main findings. First, pri- 
vatization itself was not strongly associated with rises in TFP. Second, pre- 
privatization restructuring was associated with rises in TFP. Third, mar- 
ket competition was associated with increased TFP, but, since there had 
been comparatively small rises in competition over the period, this did not 
contribute much to the actual TFP  rise. Finally, most of the rise in labor 
productivity was due to fast labor shedding. Their study did stop, however, 
in 1989, which is, again, somewhat early in the privatization process and 
does not cover periods when regulatory targets are being tightened. 
Parker and Martin (1 995) also looked at a range of firms that were pub- 
licly owned in the 1970s in a study that covered up to 1995. One innovation 
was to look at TFP  in companies relative to the whole economy (they also 
looked at postannouncement and postsale figures). Their figures confirm 
the very high TFP growth in British Steel postannouncement but prepri- 
vatization, which was also seen in BT and British Gas. Their data show a 
slowdown in TFP growth postprivatization for British Steel, British Gas, 
and BT, but an increase for BA. 
Turning to international evidence, O’Mahony (1999) calculates labor 
productivity in gas, electricity, and water in the Group of Five (G5) coun- 
tries (see figure 2.2). These data are of interest since they provide an inter- 
national productivity comparison. The United Kingdom has the lowest 
level of productivity throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and it is hard to iden- 
tify any change in trend between  1973 and 1990. (The annual average in- 
crease between 1973 and 1979 was 3.1 percent; in the following decade, it 
was 4.0 percent. The downward blip in 1984 is likely to be related to the 
miners’ strike in that year.) From 1990 onward, however, labor productiv- 
ity growth more than doubles to 9 percent a year, so that the United King- 














productivity in gas, electricity, and water 
Source: O’Mahony (1999). 
Comparative productivity in gas, electricity, and water industries;  labor 
sample. Productivity growth in the other countries only rose slightly-on 
average, from 2.4 percent in the 1980s to 3.1 percent between  1990 and 
1996-and  so an exogenous technical change is unlikely to be responsible 
for the acceleration in the United Kingdom.24  This would appear to pro- 
vide evidence of an  effect from privatization and tightened regulation, but, 
since the dates of privatization of gas, electricity, and water vary, one can- 
not be conclusive whether it is due to privatization, preprivatization re- 
structuring, or regulation. 
Table 2.5 presents our own estimates for TFP  growth in six formerly na- 
tionalized industries. The firms have been chosen on the basis of data avail- 
ability, and so industries that underwent major restructuring as they were 
privatized  had to be excluded. Most data are taken from company ac- 
counts. Labor inputs are represented by the “head count” total from the 
accounts, and gross capital inputs are derived using a perpetual-inventory 
method. Given the capital stock in year t,  we estimate the capital stock in 
year t + 1 by adding that year’s investment and subtracting the assets that 
24. The United States had the largest rise, from a dismal 0.7 percent a year during the 1980s 
to 3.9 percent a year during the 1990s, but this is far closer to the worst performer, France 
(where productivity growth fell from 4.8 percent a year to 2.4 percent) than it is to the United 
Kingdom’s figures. 90  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Table 2.5  Total Factor Productivity in the U.K. Public Sector (annual rate 
of increase; YO) 
Company  1970s  1980s 
Privatization 
1990s  Date 
1972-73  to 1978-79  1978-79  to 198748  1987-88  to 1999-2000 
British Airways  4.7  2.9  3.1  1987 
1972-73 to 1978-79  1978-79  to 1986-87  1986-87 to 1993-94 
British Coal  -2.8  0.1  9.0  1994 
1972-73 to 1978-79  1978-79  to 1986-87  198687  to 1994-95 
British Gas  8.2  2.0  1.5  1986 
1972-73  to 1978--79  1978-79  to 1988-89  1988-89 to 1997-98 
British Steel  -5.0  3.8  1.8  1988 
1972-73  to 1978-79  1978-79 to 1984-85  1984-85  to 1994-95 
British Telecom  0.6  3.2  3.0  1984 
1972-73  to 1978  79  1978-79  to 1988-89  1988-89  to 1998-99 
Post Office  1.6  1.8  1.6  Still public 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details). 
Note: Dates in bold indicate the break-points between public and private ownership. 
the company disposed  All the companies published some current cost 
accounting information during the 1980s,  including the gross replacement 
cost of their assets in current prices, and we based our estimates upon these 
figures. We estimated earlier values of the capital stock by subtracting in- 
vestment and adding disposals. The user cost of capital was the sum of the 
industry’s depreciation rate and the public-sector  test discount rate. The 
costs of other inputs were taken from the accounts and deflated by the pro- 
ducer price index (PPI) for manufacturing inputs of fuel and materials or 
by a more appropriate index where one existed (such as the PPI for the steel 
industry, which was used for British Steel). In most cases, physical output 
data are available, but for British Steel the company’s turnover was deflated 
by the PPI for the steel industry’s output. We used these data to produce 
year-by-year Tornqvist indexes of the changes in TFP and took geometric 
averages over several years. Our first period, 1972-1973, was in the middle 
of a cyclical upswing, and most of the other years we compare with it were 
at similar points in the cycle. 
We  find that the performance  in the 1970s was often weak, although 
25. When working with historic cost accounts, we must estimate the age of the assets being 
retired in order to perform all the calculations with prices reflated to a single year. With cur- 
rent cost accounts, this reflating was done by the company. Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  91 
British Gas saw high TFP  growth as it completed the country’s conversion 
to natural gas, and BA also did well. In the 1980s, most firms improved, al- 
though British Coal continued to show stagnant TFP  in the few years be- 
fore the miners’ strike of 1984-1985.26  After that strike, however, British 
Coal’s productivity rose rapidly while still in the public sector. British Air- 
ways, which saw dramatic improvements in profitability and labor produc- 
tivity, suffered a decline in TFP  growth after 1979. Four of our firms were 
privatized within our sample period, and three of these saw slight declines 
in TFP growth after privatization. Only BA improved its performance af- 
ter privatization, and the company did not regain its growth rate of the 
1970s. The one industry that has not been a serious candidate for privati- 
zation, the Post Office, had the lowest TFP growth over the period, al- 
though this may reflect the limited technological opportunities facing its 
delivery operations. Overall, it is probably fair to characterize our results 
as showing that firms tended to improve their productivity significantly in 
the run-up to privatization (with some exceptions) but giving little evidence 
that the faster growth rate was  sustained after privatization.  In other 
words, there is a catch-up rather than a permanent change of pace. 
Our results can be compared to the lower panel of table 2.4, which shows 
some studies of individual firms. Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1  996) 
compared British Gas’s twelve operating regions and found continuous 
improvements, although there was little sign that the less efficient regions 
were catching up with the better ones. Similarly, Tilley and Weyman-Jones 
(1999) found that there was no catching up among electricity-distribution 
companies, although there was productivity growth from an outward shift 
of the efficient frontier. Markou and Waddams Price (1999) looked at labor 
productivity growth in water and found that it rose before privatization but, 
owing to confidentiality, were unable to look at data by region. 
Overall, then, table 2.4 and most commentators (e.g., Pollitt 1999; Wad- 
dams Price 1999) seem to agree that preprivatization restructuring was an 
important source of productivity gains, as is increased competition. Priva- 
tization itself does not seem to be correlated with productivity growth, and 
most studies stop before the effect of regulation can be estimated with any 
reliability. Whether the commitment to privatize is essential to getting the 
gains from preprivatization restructuring remains an open question that is 
unlikely to be econometrically testable. 
2.6.1 
Even if such studies show improvements in TFP, they do not isolate the 
sources of such improvements. There are a number of possible sources. 
The Sources of Productivity Growth 
26. Our break point, 1986-1987, is chosen to allow the industry to recover from the 1984- 
1985 strike and the preceding overtime ban. 92  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
First, there might be changes in work practices in given plants. Sanchis 
(1997) uses the U.K. Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, which pro- 
vides detailed survey information on working practices at a representative 
sample of U.K. plants, some of which have been privatized. Controlling for 
cyclical variables and union presence, she finds that privatization is signifi- 
cantly linked with improvements in working practices on the shop floor.*’ 
These improvements might allow the elimination of “slack” and labor shed- 
ding, which would also raise the capital-labor  ratio without necessarily 
improving the firm’s capital stock. 
Second, the private sector might be able to close plants that a national- 
ized industry would have been constrained to keep open. If these are the 
less-efficient plants in the firm, its average TFP will rise, whether or not 
there are improvements at “survivor” plants. The firm-level studies in table 
2.4 are unable to shed light on this issue, and there is, to the best of our 
knowledge, no evidence on this for the United Kingdom. 
We therefore turn to plant-level data drawn from the Annual Respon- 
dents to the Census of Production (ARD) database, which is in turn based 
on the U.K. Census of Production (see Disney, Haskel, and Heden 2003 for 
details). Here we use data on public- and private-owned plants in a U.K. 
manufacturing industry, where the firm concerned was privatized in the 
1980s (confidentiality rules preclude us from naming the firm or industry). 
Table 2.6 sets out some raw data. Consider the top row. Employment in 
the industry as a whole shrank from just over 200,000 in 1980 to 95,821 at 
privatization to 72,276 in 1992  (when our data end).28  In 1980, 102,672  em- 
ployees worked in private plants, with 112,251 in public-sector plants. At 
privatization, the figures were 41,246 and 54,565, respectively. By  1992, 
private plants employed 45,940 and formerly public plants 26,336. So, as 
the second panel shows, public plants went from accounting for over 50 
percent of employment in 1980 to around 36 percent in 1992. As the third 
panel shows, there was also a considerable fall in the number of plants, 
with, interestingly, proportionately more closure in the private sector in the 
years before privatization at least, 
The picture is clear. The public sector had similar labor productivity to the 
The last few rows of table 2.6 show labor productivity levels and 
27. Privatization is associated with changes in working practices that reduced job demar- 
cation and increased work flexibility, for example. 
28. The fall in employment (of about 8 percent per annum) dwarfed the economywide fall 
(between 1980 and 1992, U.K. manufacturing employment fell by 3 percent per annum). 
29. The labor productivity (In YIL)  is real gross output per person-hour, deflated by a four- 
digit industry output deflator. The values of Y and L are available directly from the census, 
and the hours variables are two-digit manual hours. We calculate TFP  as  In TFP = In  Y-  ak 
In K-  a, In L -  a,,, In M,  where Y is real gross output, K real capital, L worker hours, and M 
real material use, the  cx is share of each factor in gross output, and i denotes establishment; M 
is recorded directly from the ARD. Capital stock is estimated from establishment-level in- 
vestment on in-plant vehicles and buildings, using perpetual-inventory  methods with the Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  93 
Table 2.6  Industry Data Relevant for the Plant-Level Study 
1980  Privatization  1992 
Employment 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Labor-productivity growth  (“/u  per annum) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Private 
Public (ex-public after privatization) 
Industry employment (‘YO) 
Number of plants 
Labor productivity (industry = 100) 
TFP  levels (industry = 100) 


























































Source; Authors’ calculations from ARD. 
Note; Data for “public” in 1992 refers to those plants present in 1992 but that were publicly 
owned before privatization. Growth rates are percent per annum from 1980 to privatization 
(column [2]) and privatization to 1992 (column [3]). Dashes indicate missing data. 
private sector but much lower TFP, whereas productivity growth was much 
higher in the public sector. This suggests that public plants substantially 
caught up to private plants over the period. Note that in the postprivatiza- 
tion years there was negative TFP  growth, which was during a recession. 
Although we have data on hours worked, we may not measure short time 
working and so have negative TFP. 
How did the productivity gains come about?  If the 1980  public-sector in- 
efficiency was widespread throughout plants, one would expect there to be 
plenty of scope for productivity improvement without closure. Alterna- 
tively, it could have been that the average was brought down by some very 
poor plants (kept open due to soft budget constraints in the public sector, 
starting values and depreciation rates taken from Oulton and O’Mahoney (1994). Labor in- 
put is person-hours, as before. Output, capital, and materials are all deflated by the appro- 
priate four-digit industry price deflator. Following Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), 
the factor shares are calculated at the four-digit industry level to minimize the effects of mea- 
surement error. We chose to work with the Solow measure, since it is relatively transparent 
and the empirical implementations of superlative index numbers in unbalanced panels raise 
a number of significant complications (Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 1997). 94  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
for example), in which case it could have been substantially raised by clo- 
sure. To measure this we therefore decompose productivity growth as fol- 
lows. We write industrywide productivity in year t as c = ZO,rp,l,  where 0, is 
the employment share of establishment i, and 4 and p,, are productivity 
measures (labor productivity and TFP). The decomposition proposed by 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) relates to the change in industry- 
wide productivity between t -  k and t,  At,  and is written 
where S,  N,  and Xdenotes the establishments that survive, enter, and exit, 
respectively, between t and t  ~  k.  The first term in the decomposition shows 
the contribution to productivity growth of growth among the surviving 
establishments, or the “within” effect. The second term shows the contri- 
bution of changes in shares of the survivors weighted by the deviation of 
initial-period productivity from the average (often termed the “between” 
effect). This is positive when market shares increase for those survivors 
with above-average base-year productivity. The third term is a covariance 
term that is positive when market share increases for establishments with 
growing productivity or falls for establishments with falling productivity. 
The entry and exit terms are positive when there is entry (exit) of above- 
(below-) average productivity establishments.’O 
To get a picture of the overall period, the first panel of table 2.7 sets out 
the decompositions for 1980-1992. The top panel of the table shows the re- 
sults for A In( YIL)  and the bottom panel for A ln(TFP). Each panel shows 
the results for the industry as a whole and then for the public and private 
parts of it. Each cell shows the percentage of total growth accounted for by 
each  component  of  the  disaggregation.  Consider  first  the  results  for 
A In( YIL)  in the top row of the top panel. The first column shows the con- 
tribution of the within effect and suggests that productivity growth in sur- 
viving plants accounted for about 53 percent of A In( YIL)  over the whole 
period for the whole industry. The second and third columns show that 2 
percent and 16 percent of productivity growth was due to the between and 
cross effects. That both effects are positive suggests that the most produc- 
tive plants were gaining market share (the between effect) and that plants 
whose productivity was growing were also gaining market share (the cross 
effect). The final term shows that net entry accounts for 29 percent of pro- 
ductivity growth (i.e., that the opening and closure of plants accounted for 
29 percent of industry productivity growth). 
30. There are a number of other decompositions in the literature that have different inter- 
pretations and vary in their robustness to measurement error (see Haltiwanger  1997; Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2001; and Disney, Haskel, and Heden 2003 for discussion). Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  95 
Table 2.7  Productivity Decompositions 
A In( Y/L)  (average productivity 
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Within  Between  Cross  Net Entry 
1980-1992 
53  2 
38  4 
51  1 
43  4 
20  8 
51  1 
1980 to Privatization 
59  2 
61  3 
61  2 
52  4 
27  16 

























Source: Authors’ calculations from ARD. 
Note: In top panel, “public” refers to plants publicly owned in 1980. 
The next two rows split the data into public and private. For both labor 
productivity and TFP, most growth in the public sector is accounted for by 
productivity growth within surviving plants, whereas most productivity 
growth in the private sector is accounted for by the net exit of poorly per- 
forming plants. Taking the within results for labor productivity growth and 
TFP growth together, the table is consistent with the idea that the public- 
sector plants in the 1970s were operating inefficiently  and hence had plenty 
of scope for productivity improvements even without closure. 
The second panel of table 2.7 looks at the preprivatization period.31  The 
preprivatization picture is similar to that for 1980-1992, with most public- 
sector gains due to within-plant improvements. It seems safe to conclude 
that the scope for internal productivity growth within the public company 
was greater than that for private companies. The decompositions also offer 
an interesting perspective  on efficiency gains, for this industry at least. 
Rather than keeping open inefficient plants, it would seem that much of the 
inefficiency is due to inefficient work practices within existing plants. 
3 1. The postprivatization period has very small productivity growth and negative TFP 
growth and so is hard to interpret. 96  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Table 2.8  Quality Indicators in British Telecommunications 
1979  1987  1990  1999 
Average waiting time for a new phone (days) 
Telephones installed within two weeks (%) 
Faults cleared by next working day (YO) 
Business orders completed in fewer than 6 
Faults cleared in fewer than 2 working days (‘%) 
Operator calls answered within 15 seconds (%I) 
Pay phones serviceable (XI) 
Faults per line per annum 
working days  (%I) 
71  15“ 
25h  50  64 
50  72 
~ 
28.4  67.9  88.5 
74.3  90.1 
84.2  83.5  87.7  85.8 
77  95.0  96.5 
- 
0.25  0.25 
Source; British Telecommunications Company accounts, data from http://www.bt.com/quality 
-of-service/index.htm  and RovizLi and Thompson (1991). 
Note: Dashes indicate missing data. 
“Data  for 1989. 
bData  for 1983. 
2.6.2  Quality of Service 
While productivity is important, service quality clearly also affects wel- 
fare. Critics of privatization have feared that it would lead to lower levels 
of quality. In competitive industries, this should not be a problem, but mo- 
nopolies face different incentives, and a privatized firm might be able to 
raise its profits by reducing quality (especially if it can economize on qual- 
ity in order to hit regulated target indicators). These fears were intensified 
in 1987, when BT’s quality of service appeared to decline, hit by the effects 
of a strike. The word “appeared” was chosen deliberately-BT  had pub- 
lished statistics on its quality when it was in the public sector but stopped 
doing so on privatization. As table 2.8 shows, at that time, almost a quar- 
ter of BT’s pay phones were out of service.32  Following pressure from the 
regulator, however, the company started to publish the figures again, and 
quality has generally risen since, helped by rapidly improving technology. 
To take a single example, in 1980, the average waiting time for a new phone 
was seventy-one days (Gala1 et al. 1994, tables 4 and 5). By  1989, this had 
fallen to fifteen days, although more than 1 million phones were installed 
in each year. Table 2.8 sets out these and some other relevant data and 
shows particular improvement in serviceable payphones. 
The political fallout from BT’s quality problems encouraged the gov- 
ernment to give a quality-control role to the water and electricity regula- 
tors and to introduce competition into the electricity supply industry. At 
first, the regulators were limited to publishing  quality statistics, but the 
Competition and Service (Utilities) Act of 1992 gave customers the right 
32. Pollitt (1999) notes that although BT  had a statutory obligation to opcrate a pay phone 
system it was not obliged to ensure that the pay phones worked. Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  97 
250  1 
89190  9011  9112  9213  9314  9415  9.516  9617  9718 
Year 
Fig. 2.3 
statistics: minutes lost per customer 
Source: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (2000). 
Quality indicators in electricity-electricity  distribution availability 
I> 
9819 
to compensation for specific instances of bad service, such as power inter- 
ruptions or the failure to reply to correspondence. By the time that the rail- 
ways were privatized, this had been extended, so that companies were fined 
if they failed to meet overall performance targets. There is always a danger 
that companies will respond to incentives of this kind by concentrating on 
the aspects of quality that are being monitored while ignoring other as- 
pects, but the data for the electricity industry imply a broad improvement 
since privatization. For example, figure 2.3 shows the number of minutes 
lost per customer in the electricity industry in Great Britain since 1989- 
1990, the year before privatization. The high values for the first two years 
are almost certainly weather related and should not be used to define a 
trend, but there is a clear, if slight, downward trend since 1991. 
Quality is more difficult to define in the gas industry, but a good deal of 
political controversy was caused by the seeming rise in the number of cus- 
tomers disconnected by British Gas (BG) after privatization (the company 
cut off 0.28 percent of its credit customers in 1979, 0.31 percent in 1987, 
and 0.40 percent in  1998; Rovizzi and Thompson  1991). The regulator 
asked BG to take steps to reduce disconnections, and they did then fall, in 
part because the company installed  prepayment  meters for many cus- 
tomers likely to get into debt.33 
Quality has been more controversial in the rail industry. There has been 
a rapid expansion in demand since privatization without a corresponding 
increase in network capacity. Many travellers perceived an increase in de- 
33. Airports are one of the few industries where quality is not regulated; BAA have exten- 
sive quality surveys, and the regulator seemed satisfied that no quality regulation  was re- 
quired. Rovizzi and Thompson (1991) report 1986 data for the percent ofpassengers satisfied 
with Heathrow cleanliness, catering, trolley availability, and staff helpfulness at 97.9, 75.7, 
97.0, and 96.7, with corresponding data for 1990 at 98.6, 82.5,99.4, and 98.2. 98  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Table 2.9  Signals Passed at Danger on Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure 
Level 1  Level 2  Level 8 
Year  Total  Severity  Severity  Severity  Other 
1994-1 995  77 I  355 (46%)  239 (31%)  1(0.1%1)  176 (23”’) 
1995-1996  729  299 (41Yo)  284 (39%)  0 (0.0%)  146 (20%) 
1996-1997  688  303 (44%)  227 (33%)  1 (0.1%)  157 (23%) 
1997-1998  640  282 (44%)  21  1 (33%)  1(0.2%)  146 (23%) 
1998-1 999  664  279 (42%)  232 (35%)  0 (0.0%)  153 (23%) 
1999-2000  551  215 (39%)  1  8 7 (34%)  1 (0.20/,)  148 (27%) 
Source:  Health  and  Safety  Executive,  available  at  http://www.  hse.gov.uk/railway/spad/ 
spadfeba.  htm#Table 3. 
Nores: Minimum severity: overrun 0-25  yards, no damage; level 2 severity: overrun 26-200 
yards, no damage; level 8 severity: fatalities to staff or passcngcrs. The absolute numbers by 
severity level in the table are derived from the percentage breakdowns and are therefore ac- 
curate only to 25  (apart from the figures for level 8). 
lays and cancellations after privatization, and, while some companies were 
fined for these, some received bonus payments for other aspects of their 
operations that far exceeded the fines, creating political difficulties. Fur- 
thermore, three major accidents in four ycars (Southall, September 1997, 
with seven killed; Paddington, October 1998, with thirty-one killed; and 
Hatfield, October 2000, with four killed)34  led to a public crisis of confi- 
dence in rail safety. Table 2.9 sets out some data on signals passed at danger 
(SPADs), which is a standard index of safety, along with the fraction of 
SPADs falling into various categories defined by their consequences. As 
the table shows, the number of SPADs on Railtrack’s infrastructure has de- 
clined. There has been a small rise in SPADs at level 2 of seriousness. The 
level 8 measures reflect the Southall and Paddington crashes, and because 
such events are comparatively infrequent it is hard to discern a trend. Al- 
though there is a perception that the industry has been reluctant to spend 
money on safety improvements that would save lives, the verdict on safety 
and quality in the railways is, at worst, “not proven.” Rail travel remains far 
safer than road transport, of course.35 
2.6.3 
We now consider a number of other issues. First, having looked at the 
impact of privatization  on the various sectors concerned, one might ask 
what impact it had on productivity growth in the rest of the economy. Since 
The Wider Impact of Privatization 
34. The accident at Selby, February 2001, in which ten people were killed, was caused by a 
car running off a bridge onto the line, rather than a problem with the track, signalling, or 
rolling stock. 
35. Rail death rates have been falling steadily over time: Rates per billion passenger km are 
1981, 1.0; 1986,0.9; 1991,O.g; 1996,0.3 (Office for National Statistics 1999, table 12.18). Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  99 
privatization covered the energy sector, one possibility is that privatization 
lowered energy prices below what they would otherwise have been. This 
raises the possibility that privatization might have been a positive energy 
price shock and hence may have affected productivity just as the negative 
energy shocks may have done so (Bruno and Sachs 1985; Jorgenson 1984). 
Leaving aside the question of whether privatization affected energy prices 
relative to what they would have been, the effects of energy prices on TFP 
are likely to have been small. As Jorgenson (1984) points out, energy prices 
can affect TFP  if technical progress is energy using (i.e., biased toward the 
use of energy), since a fall in energy prices causes substitution toward en- 
ergy and hence a rise in TFP  growth. Jorgenson’s estimates for U.S. manu- 
facturing, however, suggest that the biases are, in practice, very small, and 
hence even a halving of energy prices (which seems an overestimate of the 
effects of privatization) would still lead to a rise in TFP  growth of around 
0.05 percentage points per ann~m.~~ 
How successful was privatization in weakening the power of the public- 
sector unions? As Pendleton (1997) argues, this rather depends on what 
one thinks the source of public-sector union power is. To the extent that it 
is unions having high-level consultation with ministers on strategic policy 
for nationalized industries, then privatization has clearly reduced this dras- 
tically. However, since in the 1970s many workers in nationalized compa- 
nies were denied the money for pay raises as part of government incomes 
policy, this could help unions to gain advantages for their members. To the 
extent that it is unions having, for example, particular bargaining rights 
(when established nationalized industries were required to consult and ne- 
gotiate with workers), the picture is very mixed. Bargaining arrangements 
changed, for example, in the Post Office, in which the separation into mail, 
parcels, and counters in the early 1980s  led to the devolution of bargaining. 
Parry, Waddington, and Critcher (1997) argue that there has been a greater 
trend toward “management assertiveness” in electricity, shipbuilding, and 
water. On the other hand, Ogden (1990) finds that union membership and 
the scope of bargaining in water, telecoms, and gas did not change on pri- 
vatization, and Millward et al. (1992), reviewing the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS) evidence, “saw virtually no evidence” that trade 
union  negotiating  rights  were  withdrawn  from  unionized  workplaces. 
Thus, it seems hard to argue that, in general, public-sector  unions were 
weakened any more than unions were generally weakened by labor legisla- 
tion and the macroeconomy. Finally, Bishop and Thompson (1994) docu- 
36. With a translog cost function, TFP  growth is the sum of Hicks neutral technical change 
(a,,)  and biased technical progress times the log of the price of the particular factor (Berndt 
and Wood 1982)-that  is, A In TFY = a,,  + aE  In pE  + az  In pz,  where E denotes energy and 
2 is other factors. As reported by Oulton and O’Mahony (1994), Jorgenson finds that a, is, 
on average, 0.0007 for U.S. manufacturing. Hence, a halving of energy prices raises TFP 
growth by 0.0007 . In 2.  100 = 0.049 percentage points. 100  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Table 2.10  Public Attitudes toward Privatization (“h  of favoring responses) 
1983  1986  1987  1989  1990  1991 
“Are the nationalized industries 
well run?” (‘x agreeing)  21  31  33 
Control of wages by law  48  40  34  28  30  33 
Control of prices by law  70  61  58  56  56  60 
Less state ownership of industry  49  30  30  24  24 
More state ownership of industry  11  16  16  18 
About the same level of state 
Government should own the 
- 
ownership of industry as now  33  49  48  53 
~  -  electricity industry  28  26  32  28 
Sources: Top row, Jowell, Witherspoon, and Brook (1988); other rows, Jowell et al. (1992). 
Note: Blank cells indicate that question was not asked in that year. Dashes indicate missing 
data. 
ment that performance-related pay was introduced in the period of prepri- 
vatization restructuring in all of the 1979 public sector (except BA). 
Third, did privatization change people’s attitudes to the public sector? 
Table 2.10 sets out some findings from the British Social Attitudes Survey. 
The first row reports the proportion agreeing that nationalized industries 
are well run and shows a rise in that proportion between 1983 and 1987. 
This could reflect the increased productivity in these industries, or it could 
reflect that people are referring to previously nationalized industries. 
Rows (4),  (5), and (6) show attitudes to state ownership (with attitudes 
to wage and price control added for reference). The proportion favoring 
wage and price control has fallen steadily. The proportion favoring less 
state ownership has fallen a good deal, but, since the state sector has fallen 
as well, this suggests decreasing support forfurther privatization. The pro- 
portion favoring more state ownership has grown, but only somewhat. The 
proportion  favoring about the same level of state ownership has grown 
substantially, and, since the sector has shrunk, this is de facto approval of 
privatization. Finally, the proportion favoring state control of the electric- 
ity industry shows no clear trend (privatization was announced in 1987  and 
implemented in 1990-1991). Overall, however, the data suggest no strong 
support for renationalization and increasing support for the privatizations 
that have occurred. 
2.7  Contracting Out 
In the 1970s, practically all central and local government services were 
provided directly by government employees. In the early 1980s, however, 
some local councils began to contract out services, such as refuse collec- 
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laundry services from the private  sector. In an influential study, Dom- 
berger, Meadowcroft, and Thompson (1  986) modeled the refuse collection 
costs of 305 local authorities, accounting for collection method, popula- 
tion density, and so forth, and whether the service had been contracted out 
and awarded to a private contractor, awarded to the in-house organization 
after competition, or had not been the subject of competition. Thus, this 
study is of particular interest since it provides a control group to contrast 
with private ownership. Relative to not being contracted out at all, costs 
were 22 percent lower when awarded to a private contractor and 17 percent 
lower when contracted out but awarded in-house. These cost savings were 
insignificantly different from each other, suggesting that it was the injec- 
tion of competition from the contracting-out process that was important 
for cost savings rather than whether the operator was public or private. In 
a study of contracting for domestic services in hospitals, Domberger, Mea- 
dowcroft, and Thompson (1987) also found savings of about 20 percent 
(although there was some evidence that early contract awards had involved 
much lower prices than this, which they argued were unsustainable and 
reflected “winner’s curse” effects). 
Domberger and Jensen (1 997) report a number of other studies, includ- 
ing a meta-analysis by the Australian Industry Commission, which pro- 
duced a “rather wide” distribution of reported savings (from a cost increase 
of more than 10 percent to a saving of more than 50 percent). The most fre- 
quently reported savings, however, were between 10 and 30 percent, which 
“is entirely consistent with  the conclusions based  on U.K. data” (73). 
Given these savings, and the government’s desire to reduce the size of the 
public sector, compulsory competitive tendering was introduced in 1988. 
The central government also started to contract out services, and approx- 
imately &2  billion of white-collar services had been subjected to competi- 
tive tendering by 1995 (Domberger and Jensen). 
There have been claims that most of these savings have come from re- 
ductions in quality or in the terms and conditions offered to staff. Dom- 
berger and Jensen (1997) conclude, however, that most of these savings 
have come from “better management,  more flexible working practices, 
more efficient use of capital and greater innovation spurred by competi- 
tion” (1997,74). Cubbin, Domberger, and Meadowcroft (1987) found that 
the technical efficiency of private refuse operators was 17 percent higher 
than that of authorities that had not put their services out to tender. This 
would account for three-quarters of the savings identified by Domberger, 
Meadowcroft,  and Thompson  (1986). However,  insofar  as employees 
gained rents from technical inefficiency, increasing efficiency would de- 
stroy those rents and reduce the employees’ welfare. (For example, refuse 
workers might be able to serve an area in a shorter time than was allowed 
in their roster and would take the difference as leisure. Preserving such rents 
is not necessarily a legitimate objective of public policy, however.) 102  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
Councils’ direct-labor organizations were allowed to bid against private 
firms. In the early studies in which these organizations won contracts, they 
were offering cost savings that were not significantly different from those 
under contracts awarded to the private sector, suggesting (yet again) that 
competition rather than ownership is the key to efficiency. After the intro- 
duction of compulsory competitive tendering, however, Szymanski (1  996) 
found that local authorities that awarded contracts to their in-house teams 
were achieving significantly lower savings-a  10 percent rather than the 20 
percent reduction from private contractors. It is at least possible that some 
of these councils, which had resisted compulsory tendering, were favoring 
their in-house organizations when they awarded contracts. If the in-house 
teams appreciated this reduction  in  competition, they could rationally 
offer fewer cost savings when bidding. In other words, what appears to be 
a difference due to ownership could still be related to competition. 
There were fears that quality would also be impaired when services were 
contracted out. In practice, however, service levels appear to have been 
maintained or even enhanced, perhaps because contracting out has been 
associated with greater monitoring and more explicit standards (Dom- 
berger and Jensen 1997). In general, therefore, we conclude that efficiency 
gains from privatization are not due to lower levels of quality. 
2.8  The Private Finance Initiative 
The last kind of privatization that we consider is sometimes presented as 
a form of contracting out, in that the government is buying services from a 
private company. The difference is that the private finance initiative (PFI) 
involves investment, or the purchase of existing assets, which are used to 
provide the services req~ired.~’  The PFI has been used to finance roads, 
prisons, hospitals, and schools. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link was finally 
started as a PFI project, and the government is planning to finance much- 
needed investment for the London Underground through the PFI. So far, 
the PFI has funded El5 billion in investment, about 20 percent of the gov- 
ernment’s capital spending over the period. 
The administration of the PFI reflects a number of the principles the 
government has announced for it. First, there must be transfer of risk to 
the private sector. When a prison is built under the PFI, this means that 
the private company takes on the risk of building and operating it. When 
a road is funded in this way, a further risk transfer is achieved by making 
payments to the company conditional on the number of vehicles using the 
road. Second, the project must deliver value for money, and, third, there 
must be open competition for the project. 
The PFI has a number of potential advantages. Even if there are good 
37. For excellent reviews of the PFI, see Grout (1997) and Pollit (2000). Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  103 
reasons for the state to subsidize services, due to externalities (e.g., roads), 
this does not necessarily mean that the public sector should build the as- 
sets to deliver the services or, in some cases, provide the services itself. One 
particular advantage arises due to risk allocation. Some of the risks of 
building, for example, a prison arise mainly from factors under the con- 
struction company’s control, such as  poor management. Traditional public 
procurement has often passed these risks back to the state, whereas PFI 
contracts for services may ensure that there is no payment to the private 
sector until building is completed, therefore transferring risk to the private 
sector.)*  There would be no need for such a policy if the government and 
private sector could write complete contracts that could, for example, spec- 
ify varying payments for late completion of an asset depending on all pos- 
sible circumstances that could in turn be ~erified.)~  Once the prison is in 
service, risks are more likely to come from government policy, such as new 
legislation raising the prison population, and a more flexible contract may 
be appropriate. Another advantage claimed for the PFI is that it removes 
public-sector investment from the PSBR. This is not just cosmetic, as the 
PSBR can be a binding constraint on governments, and  moving investment 
outside the PSBR allows increased spending. The requirement to transfer 
risk is, in part, a way of ensuring that a PFI project is more than just a way 
of borrowing money without counting it toward the PSBR. 
Against this, the PFI has some potential disadvantages. First, it can only 
work  well  if outputs and inputs can be measured and contracted  over 
clearly. Second, PFI contracts can be inflexible: the government has to 
carry on with a project even if it decides it does not wish to do so. Third, 
the PFI,  just as with direct borrowing by the government, transfers costs to 
future generations (compared with spending out of current tax revenue), 
which may or may not be desirable. 
Critics of the PFI point out that the cash cost of PFI projects is increased 
by the higher interest rates required by the private sector compared to the 
cost of public borrowing. Some of the value-for-money comparisons, in 
which the PFI nevertheless appears to be the cheaper option, assume very 
large efficiency gains from private-sector delivery to offset the higher inter- 
est cost. Grout (1997) points out that this additional interest cost ought to 
be disregarded, since the cost of public-sector borrowing should be project 
specific and should depend upon the risks involved. Public borrowing for 
a risky project appears cheaper only because it is being subsidized by the 
government’s ability to raise taxes if things go wrong. If this hidden subsidy 
38. The National Audit Office (NAO; 1992), for example, estimated that the Department of 
Transport was paying an average of  28  percent more for roads than the price originally 
agreed. 
39. Such risks can be hard to predict, however. The Skye Bridge PFI project local public en- 
quiry resulted in delays and design changes (in order to protect a local otter population) cost- 
ing E3.8 million out of a total cost of 2539  million (Pollitt 2000). 104  Richard Green and Jonathan Haskel 
is made explicit, public provision appears more expensive, and the PFI 
seems to be a relatively better value for money. In a sample of seventeen 
PFI projects,  the value of the risk transferred to the private sector ac- 
counted for 60 percent of the expected savings from using the PFI, and 
six projects depended on these savings to pass the value-for-money test 
(Arthur Andersen  and Enterprise London School of Economics 2000, 
table 5.9). 
The question is whether the subsidy should be made explicit in this way. 
If the PFI  transfers some risks away from the government, does that reduce 
the interest rate on the national debt? If the capital markets believe that 
there is no chance of default by the British government-whether  or not it 
has to bear the risks involved in PFI projects-the  implication is that the 
interest rate on the national debt is not affected by the PFI.40  If this is the 
case, it could be argued that projects within the public sector receive “in- 
surance” against risks at no real cost to the taxpayer, while the PFI requires 
the taxpayer to pay the private sector for risk bearing4’  It may well be ap- 
propriate to use a higher test discount rate when assessing the desirability 
of a risky project, but that does not mean that the public sector should pay 
that higher rate through the PFI if cheaper financing is available. The case 
for the PFI would come back to the private sector’s ability to produce ser- 
vices more efficiently than the public sector, and the efficiency must be 
great enough to offset the higher financing cost. 
A series of NAO reports point to a mixed experience of the PFI. On the 
positive side, the NAO reports that a number of projects have gone ahead 
that simply would not have been financed were they to have come out of the 
public-sector capital budgets (e.g., the Channel Tunnel Rail link and the 
Skye Bridge; NAO 1997). On the negative side, bidding costs are high- 
estimated at E500 million for all outstanding PFI contracts in 1998 (Kerr 
1998), which are then reflected in the final price-and  delays can be long 
(up to two years). Furthermore, some contracts have substantially over- 
run, with some contract terms requiring the government to withstand the 
costs  (e.g., computerizing post  office  payments).  Finally,  in  practice, 
private-sector firms may have been adept at convincing the government to 
withstand more of the risks than would be optimal. 
Thus, some PFI  projects seem to have been successful and some not. The 
NAO judges the PFI prison contracts to have been well planned, to have 
offered good value for money, and to have been completed in almost half 
the time relative to public prison projects. On the other hand, the wrong 
discount rate was used in the evaluation of the comparative costs of several 
40. This argument applies to the current state of the British economy-it  would certainly 
not hold true for all countries or even all periods in British economic history. 
41. A public-sector union has suggested that some services are suffering because public- 
sector budgets have not been increased to cover the extra capital charges involved in buying 
services through the PFI (Unison 2000). Seeking a Premier-League Economy: The Role of Privatization  105 
road projects, potentially biasing the choice of financing method (Pollitt 
2000). 
2.9  Conclusions 
Did privatization itself raise productivity? No. There seems to be very 
little evidence that the transfer of a public undertaking to a private one 
raises efficiency.  British Gas is perhaps the classic example: a company that 
was transferred to the private sector with the same structure, same man- 
agement, and very light regulation. Other companies were allowed to use 
British Gas’s pipes to carry gas but at tariffs set by British Gas. No pro- 
ductivity gain occurred. 
Did the process of privatization raise productivity? The answer is a re- 
sounding yes: Preprivatization restructuring, more competition, and tighter 
regulation all raised efficiency. Real change in the gas industry, for example, 
started in the early 1990s, once the competition authorities started to force 
open the industry. An open question is whether the commitment to privati- 
zation was essential to obtaining these gains. 
We should also ask whether the clear change in the level of productivity 
that has been associated with privatization has evolved into higher rates 
of productivity growth. The problem here is that the process of catching up 
to private-sector levels of productivity can easily take the best part of a 
decade, and it is only after that process is complete that we will be able to 
discern what has happened to growth rates. At the moment, all that we can 
say is that it is hard to see an effect of privatization on productivity growth 
rates. The effect of privatization on quality seems to depend on strong reg- 
ulation. 
Privatization in the sense of asset sales is now more or less finished in the 
United Kingdom for the simple reason that there is little left to sell. Thus, 
the key concerns for the future are developing regulation and reshaping the 
PFI. It is also likely that future administrations will want to use the private 
sector more in delivering health and education services. 
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